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Business Owner Liability and Concealed
Weapons Legislation: A Call for Legislative
Guidance for Pennsylvania Business Owners
A. Nicole Hartley*
I.

Introduction

Homicides resulting from workplace violence are the first leading
cause of death for women in the workplace and the third leading cause of
death for men.' Between 1993 and 1999, 1.7 million people were
victims of violence while at work or on duty. 2 Estimates of the economic
cost of workplace violence are as high as thirty-five billion dollars per
year.3 Over 77 percent of workplace homicides in 2002 were the result
of a shooting. In workplace violence incidents that did not result in
death, 30 percent of victims reported that their attackers were armed, and
one-third of those attackers carried handguns.
In response to workplace violence, business owners 6 are
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2004; B.A., Washington and Lee University, 2001. The author wishes to thank her
family and friends for their unwavering support and guidance. Special thanks go to
James and Lois Hartley, Tom Stover, and Professor Marc Conner.

1.

BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NAT'L CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

(2001), available at www.bls.gov. The 2001 workplace homicide rate (which excludes
the deaths that occurred on September 11, 2001) was at its lowest level since the Bureau
of Labor Statistics began compiling statistics in 1992.
See id., available at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
2.

BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NAT'L CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY,

1993-1999

(2001), availableat www.bls.gov.
3. Deanne M. Mosley & Amy D. Whitten, Caught in the Crossfire: Employer's
Liabilityfor Workplace Violence, 70 Miss. L.J. 505, 507 (2000) (citing a 1997 survey by
the Workplace Violence Institute). Costs associated with workplace violence include lost
workdays, litigation costs, and recovery costs. Id.
4.

BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NAT'L CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

(2002), availableat http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfib0I56.pdf.
5.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY ADMIN., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE AWARENESS

AND PREVENTION (1996), available at
http://www.osha.gov/workplace-violence/wrkplaceViolence.Partl.html.
6. This Comment uses the term "business owner" in the general sense of a private
property owner or a person who, although she does not posses title to the property, has a
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implementing workplace safety policies designed to prevent violent acts
Searches,
committed by employees or on business premises.7
surveillance, background checks, psychological and drug testing, and
stress management programs have become standard methods of
combating workplace violence.8
Business owners increasingly include weapons regulations in
workplace safety policies, either prohibiting employees from carrying
weapons while in the scope of employment or restricting the areas where
employees may carry or display weapons. 9 Business owners also post
notices prohibiting non-employees from carrying weapons on business
premises.) °
Business owners, however, face legal uncertainty in the wake of
legislation permitting citizens to carry weapons concealed on their
person.1 ' Business owners who do not prohibit concealed weapons could
be liable for failing to control employees who intentionally or
accidentally cause injuries using a weapon,' 2 for permitting employees
with violent histories or inadequately supervised employees to carry
weapons on the premises,13 for failing to protect customers from
concealed weapons carriers, 14 or for creating an unsafe work
environment for employees.' 5 If a business owner does choose to
prohibit concealed weapons, she could still face liability for failing to
adequately enforce a weapons prohibition, 16 for violent acts that could
have been stopped if victims had been permitted to carry weapons,' 7 or
for turning the business premises into a target for criminals seeking
unarmed victims.18 Consider the following scenarios.

Scenario One: An employee obtains a permit to carry a concealed
weapon and brings it to the workplace. The employer does not prohibit
greater right to possession than the actor. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. DM-363 (1995).
7. See Tanja Lueck Thompson, Weapons in the Workplace: The Effect of
Tennessee's Concealed Weapons Statute on Employer Liability, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 28 1,
300-08 (1997).
8. These methods have met constitutional challenges that will not be addressed in
this Comment. See id.
9. See What's Happening in Employment Law, 5 DEL. EMP. LAW LETTER (Mar.
2000). A recent study by the Society for Human Resources indicates that as many as 79
percent of employers regulate or prohibit weapons on business premises. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Richard Dahl, The Sign of the Future May Be "Please Check Your Gun at
the Door," 82 A.B.A. J. 72 (Aug. 1996).
12. See infra Part I1.A.1. and accompanying notes.
13. See infra Part lI.A.2. and accompanying notes.
14. See infra Part II.A.3. and accompanying notes.
15. See infra Part II.C. and accompanying notes.
16. See infra Part II.A.3. and accompanying notes.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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weapons on the business premises. During a robbery on the business
premises, the employee draws the weapon in self-defense but
accidentally shoots a customer instead of the robber. The customer sues
the employer, claiming that the employer is liable for the employee's
negligence because the employer should have prohibited weapons. Is the
employer liable?
Scenario Two: An employee threatens to "blow up my cubicle."
The employer ignores the threat and, because she does not conduct
background checks, is unaware that the employee recently obtained a
permit to carry a concealed weapon. The employer does not prohibit
weapons on the business premises. The employee shoots a customer
after the customer insults him. Is the employer liable?
Scenario Three: A business owner prohibits weapons on the
business premises, but a customer ignores the prohibition and carries a
firearm, concealed in her purse, onto the business premises. The gun
accidentally fires and injures another customer. The injured customer
sues the business owner, claiming that she failed to adequately enforce
the weapons prohibition. Is the business owner liable?
Scenario Four: A customer with a permit to carry a concealed
weapon sees a notice on a store window prohibiting weapons. The
customer leaves his weapon in his car and enters the store. While exiting
the store, the customer is attacked by an unknown assailant. The
customer sues the store's owner, claiming that the attack could have been
stopped if the customer had been carrying a concealed weapon. Is the
business owner liable?
Part II of this Comment addresses the preceding scenarios in the
context of private property owner liability in states with concealed
weapons legislation. This Comment concludes that, despite the risk of
liability when weapons prohibitions are inadequately enforced, business
owners should implement workplace safety policies applicable to both
employees and non-employees that prohibit or significantly limit the
presence of weapons on business premises.
Part III of this Comment recommends legislative guidance for
Pennsylvania business owners seeking to prohibit weapons on business
premises. Using states with similar concealed permitting policies as a
model, this Comment concludes that business owners should be given
explicit legislative authority to prohibit concealed weapons carriers from
the business premises and specific methods for posting notices of a
prohibition. Criminal sanctions should also be imposed against violators
of concealed weapons prohibitions, and employers should be granted
access to permitting information in order to conduct background checks
of prospective and current employees.
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Business Owner Liability for Workplace Violence

Business owners could be liable to both employees and nonemployees for weapons-related injuries occurring on their business
premises. Although sovereign immunity would most likely bar any
negligence action against public employers,1 9 private businesses face
significant liability for violent acts committed by their employees or on
business premises.
A.

Theories ofBusiness Owner Liability to Non-Employees

1. Respondeat Superior
Employers could be liable for the violent acts of an employee based
on the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. As a general rule,
employers are liable for the tortious acts of their employees committed
during the scope of employment.20 An employee is within the scope of
employment if his conduct "(o) is the kind he is employed to perform; (b)
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c)
is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master."" If the
the use of force must not be totally
employee uses intentional force,
22
unexpected by the employer.
Employees committing intentional violent acts with a weapon,

19. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (2002). Sovereign immunity bars any action at
law against government entities not enumerated as a specific exception. Id. The
exceptions to sovereign immunity listed in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522 are narrowly
construed. See Love v. Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531, 532 (Pa. 1988). Acts committed by
a third party involving weapons would most likely not fall within any of the exceptions to
sovereign immunity. See Greenleaf v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 698 A.2d 170 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997) (the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity did not apply
where a victim of a criminal assault asserted a negligence claim against a train operator
for not opening the train's doors to allow him to escape); Alexander v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 586 A.2d 475 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (the medical-professional exception did
not apply because the harm was caused by the criminal acts of a third party); Douglas v.
Phila. Hous. Auth., 578 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (the real estate exception did
not apply because the actions of a third party were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury).
The Commonwealth Employees' Right to Self-Defense Act, a bill introduced in
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in February 2003, would create a cause of
action against Commonwealth employers who "discharge, threaten or otherwise
discriminate" against employees who carry weapons. H.R. 185, 2003 Leg., 187th Gen.
Sess. (Pa. 2003), availableat
http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2003/0/HBO185PO214.pdf.
20. See Lunn v. Yellow Cab Co., 169 A.2d 103, 104 (Pa. 1961); Brennan v.
Merchant & Co., 54 A. 891, 891 (Pa. 1903).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228; see Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon, 410
A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa. Super Ct. 1979).
22. See Fitzgerald,410 A.2d at 1272.
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Although

respondeat superior liability can result from an employee's intentional
and criminal acts,23 the liability does not extend to an employee's
"outrageous acts" that indicate a motive of personal malice.2 4
In Pennsylvania, claims of respondeat superior have been denied
when the employees' violent acts involved a firearm. 25 The employees
were found to be acting outside the scope of employment due to the
"outrageous" nature of their actions. 2 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected a respondeat superior claim against a cab company because the
cab driver's use of a gun to shoot at a taunting crowd indicated a motive
of personal malice.27 The court has also held that a bartender who shot a
customer for annoying a female customer was outside the scope of
employment despite a workplace policy requiring bartenders to maintain
the safety of the premises.2 8
In both cases, however, the court focused on the irrationality of the
employee's actions rather than the actual use of a weapon. 29 If an
employee uses a weapon for a rational purpose that does not indicate a
motive of personal malice, the employer could still be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the employee's negligence.3 °
For example, the employee in Scenario One fires a weapon to
prevent a robbery and to protect the employer's business. The employer
does not prohibit weapons; therefore, the use of force by the employee is
not totally unexpected. The employee's act of stopping the robbery
appears to be rational and motivated by an intent to serve his employer,
rather than by personal malice. As a result, the employer in Scenario
One could be liable for the injury to the customer caused by the
23. See Orr v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 12 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1940);
Pilipovich v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 172 A. 136 (Pa. 1934).
24. See Lunn, 169 A.2d at 104 (rejecting a respondeat superior claim against a cab
company whose driver assaulted a pedestrian).
25. Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Knox, 113 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. 1955); Howard v.
Zaney Bar, 85 A.2d 401, 403 (Pa. 1952).
26. Potter, 113 A.2d at 551; Howard, 85 A.2d at 403.
27. Potter, 113 A.2d at 551.
28.

Howard,85 A.2d at 403.

29. "The disorder [caused by the bar customer] was so insignificant and the use of
violent force so excessive and dangerous, totally without responsibility or reason, that we
are compelled as a matter of law to absolve defendant of vicarious liability." Id. "There
was no need for [the taxicab driver] to protect himself... it was an act wholly
unauthorized by his employers." PotterTitle, 113 A.2d at 552.
30. In Pennsylvania, employees using firearms are most often considered within the
scope of employment when the employees are security personnel authorized to carry
weapons to protect the business premises. See Orr, 12 A.2d at 27; Berryman v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 77 A. 1011 (Pa. 1910). Because the scope of employment depends on the
circumstances, whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment remains
a question for the jury. Simmons v. Pa. R.R. Co., 48 A. 1070, 1072 (Pa. 1901).
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employee's use of a weapon.
Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention
2.
Employers could be liable for the violent acts of their employees
based on a theory of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. An
employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting, supervising,
and controlling employees. 31 An employer breaches that duty if the
employer "knew of or should have known that an employee was
a
dangerous, careless or incompetent and such employment might create
person.' 32
situation where the employee's conduct would harm a third
Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer could be
liable under the theory of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention for
the violent acts of an employee involving weapons, even if the act's
"outrageous" nature indicates a motive of personal malice. If an
employee acts for personal reasons and is therefore outside the scope of
employment, an employer is still liable under a theory of negligent
(1) on the
hiring, supervision, or retention if the act occurred:
to
is
permitted
employee
the
that
premises
on
(2)
premises;
employer's
the
using
was
employee
the
enter only as an employee; or (3) while
employer's property.3 3
Permitting weapons in the workplace could expose an employer to
claims that the employer should have foreseen that an employee could
harm a third person or that employees carrying weapons should have
been more closely supervised. 34 The doctrine of negligent hiring,
supervision, or retention requires that the employer foresee that the
employee could harm a third person 35 and foresee the necessity to control
the employee.36 If it is foreseeable to an employer that an employee
could commit an act of violence, then the employer is under a duty to
control the employee.37 Because employees with weapons could cause
more harm than unarmed employees, the possibility that an employee's
actions could harm a third person and that control of employees is
necessary becomes more foreseeable to an employer who permits
31.

Brezenski v.World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000);
§ 213 (1958).
Brezenski, 755 A.2d at 39; Dempsey v. Waldo Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418 (Pa.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

32.
1968).
33. Brezenski, 755 A.2d at 41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
34. See Raneta Lawson Mack, This Gun for Hire: Concealed Weapons Legislation
in the Workplace and Beyond, 30 CREIGTON L. REV. 285, 312 (1997).
35. Brezenski, 755 A.2d at 39.
36. Id. at41.
37. See Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1057 (Pa. 1999) (holding bishop liable
for failure to prevent a priest from committing the foreseeable harm of molestation when
he knew of the priest's pedophilic propensity and the opportunity to commit acts of
abuse).
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weapons in the workplace.38

For example, the employer in Scenario Two permits weapons in the
workplace and therefore should have foreseen that an employee carrying
a weapon could fire it. The employer could be liable for failing to
conduct an adequate background check to discover if the employee had a
permit to carry a concealed weapon. 39 The employer could also be liable
for inadequately supervising an armed employee or for retaining the
employee after he made violent threats. Ultimately, an employer who
permits weapons in the workplace may be more susceptible to a claim of
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.
3. Premises Liability
Business owners could be liable for the violent acts of a third party
committed against public invitees 40 or business visitors. 4' A business
owner must take reasonable care to discover accidental, negligent, or
intentional acts being committed, or acts that are likely to be committed,
and to protect visitors from those acts.4 2 An owner does not exercise
reasonable care if she fails to use reasonable means to protect invitees
despite knowledge that violent acts may occur based on past experience
or the place and character of the business.43
A business owner who prohibits weapons on the business premises
could be shielding himself from premises liability. Prohibiting weapons
is a reasonable means of increasing safety for customers because it
prevents employees and other customers from using weapons to cause
accidental or intentional harm.44
38. See Mack, supra note 34, at 312-15.
39. Business owners should require current and prospective employees to "identify
whether they have applied for or been issued a license to carry a handgun, have been
denied a license or had their license revoked or suspended, or have been charged with or
convicted for violating any law or regulation relating to concealed handguns." See Dahl,
supra note 11. In Pennsylvania, however, all information relating to an individual's
application or subsequent revocation of a concealed weapons permit is confidential and
therefore an employer could not verify the information provided by employees. See 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111 (i) (2002).
40.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).

A public invitee is a person

"invited to enter and remain on the land as a member of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public." Id.
41. A business visitor is "a person who is invited to enter and remain on the land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of
the land." Id.
42. See Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-in Theater, Inc., 246 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1968)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)).

43. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344, cmt. F (1965)). The duty is
one of reasonable care and the owner is not to be viewed as an insurer of the visitor's
safety. Id.
44. See Mack, supra note 34, at 314. A "ban may help avoid a situation where a
distraught employee grabs a gun and opens fire." Tom Puleo & Matthew Daly, State
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However, a business owner who prohibits weapons may also be
subjecting himself to a heightened duty of care. A business owner could
be liable for failing to adequately enforce a weapons prohibition;
although under no duty to provide extra safety precautions such as
security personnel or metal detectors, an owner is liable for the negligent
provision of the precautions provided.4 5
For example, the business owner in Scenario Three who fails to
detect the concealed weapon in a customer's purse could be liable for
negligently enforcing the weapons prohibition. However, courts may be
reluctant to impose a duty on a business owner to install metal detectors
or otherwise act as an insurer of safety.46 Only the Texas Attorney
General has addressed the issue; he suggests that a business owner who
posts a notice of a weapons prohibition exercises sufficient reasonable
care so that he would not be liable for injuries caused by customers who
violate the prohibition.47
A weapons prohibition also prevents customers from using weapons
for protection. As a result, business owners prohibiting weapons may
have the added burden of taking precautions to prevent the business
premises from becoming a place where criminals know they can easily
attack unarmed customers.4 8
For example, the business owner in Scenario Four could be liable
for preventing the customer from protecting himself with his concealed
weapon. Although the customer would have to demonstrate that the
attack could have been prevented if he had been carrying his weapon, the
business owner could be liable for creating a dangerous environment for
customers by preventing them from defending themselves.4 9

Off-ices Shouldn't Resemble the Wild Wild West, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 5, 1999, at
Al.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); see also Feld v. Merriam,
485 A.2d 742, 746-47 (Pa. 1984) (citing § 323 and stating that the extra precaution of
employing security personnel leads to a heightened duty).
46. See Dahl, supra note 11.
47. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. DM-363 (1995).
48. See Mack, supra note 34, at 314. A Texas woman whose parents were shot at a
cafeteria while she attempted to fend off the attacker with a butter knife has been credited
with convincing legislatures in several states to adopt legislation permitting citizens to
carry concealed weapons. See Ralph Winningham, Texas Massacre Spurs Concealed
HandgunLaw, TIMES UNION, Oct. 27, 1997, at 1.
49. See Dahl, supra note 11. Glenn Reynolds, a constitutional law scholar and
associate professor at the University of Tennessee College of Law, states that if he were a
store owner who prohibited weapons, "I would worry that I would be in a position of
essentially being an insurer. That is, having deprived people of the ability to defend
themselves, I would have [incurred a] responsibility to protect them." Id.
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Theories of Business Owner Liability to Employees

An employer could be liable to his employees for the violent act of
a third party if the act is motivated by personal reasons rather than workrelated animosity. Although Worker's Compensation Acts generally
provide the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained in the workplace,5 ° an
exception exists for acts motivated by "personal reasons." 5 '
An employee injured by a co-worker must prove the co-worker's
personal motivation in order to sustain a respondeat superior or negligent
hiring, retention, or supervision claim against his employer.5 2 "When an
employee is injured in an attack by a fellow employee, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the claimant is covered by the [Worker's
Compensation] Act."53 An attack resulting from an ongoing "feud" may
be motivated by personal reasons even though the "initial spark for the
animosity was work-related.,

54

When a history of animosity cannot be

found, however, the attack is presumed to be motivated by work-related
55
animosity and therefore the Worker's Compensation Act controls.
An employee injured by a non-employee could claim general
premises liability against his employer; however, he must still prove that

50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (West 2002). Because this Comment focuses on
legislative protections for Pennsylvania business owners, the discussion of worker's
compensation law includes only Pennsylvania law.
51. Id. § 411; see Krasevic v. Goodwill Indus., 764 A.2d 561, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000) ("[A] showing of personal animus is not strictly required... what is required is a
showing that the victim was attacked for purely personal reasons unrelated to
employment.").
52. See Mike v. Aliquippa, 421 A.2d 251, 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
53. Id. (holding that an attack by fellow police officers was motivated by personal
reasons because the dispute had been ongoing for several months and was a retaliation for
the victim filing charges against the assailants). An employee "must assert that his
injuries are not work-related because he was injured for purely personal reasons." Kohler
v. McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27, 31 (Pa. 1992).
54. Mike, 421 A.2d at 254; see McBride v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 188 A.2d 775,
777 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (applying the personal reasons exception because a dispute
between co-workers existed for eight years before the attack occurred); Scott v. Acme
Wire Prod. Co., 319 A.2d 436, 438 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (applying the personal
reasons exception because the dispute arose from pre-existing animosity that was not
work-related).
55. See Abbott v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 758 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000) (holding that the "personal reasons" exception did not apply where an employee
shot fellow employees because the employee was suspended immediately before the
incident, the victims did not socialize outside of the workplace with the employee, and
the employee shot only supervisory personnel); see also Feidler v. Morris Coupling Co.,
784 A.2d 812, 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (rejecting a negligence claim against an
employer because the employee failed to demonstrate a history of personal animosity
with his fellow employee); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 412 A.2d
196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (holding that "horseplay," which led to an injury, was not
motivated by personal reasons and granting worker's compensation).
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the act was motivated by personal reasons. When an injury occurs on the
employer's premises, there is a rebuttable presumption that the injury is
work-related.f 6 An employee injured by a non-employee, however, may
be more successful in proving that the violent act was
motivated by
57
personal reasons because no working relationship exists.

C. Employer Sanctions Under the OccupationalSafety and Health Act
Employers are required by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") to provide a workplace "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees. 58 Civil sanctions are imposed on businesses that fail to
comply with OSHA standards. 59 Although a 1995 OSHA decision did
not extend the "recognized hazard" element to workplace violence,
recent OSHA guidelines and increased publication of workplace violence
statistics indicate that OSHA may be willing to recognize workplace
violence as a sanctionable hazard.6 °
If OSHA recognizes workplace violence, then employers who
prohibit weapons could be eliminating foreseeable hazards. 6 1 By
prohibiting weapons, however, the employer could also be admitting that
violence is foreseeable: "It's difficult to argue that the violence was not
foreseeable because, in fact, the employer was taking specific steps to
62
prevent violence in the workplace.,
III.

Legislative Guidance for Pennsylvania Business Owners Who
Prohibit Weapons on Business Premises

Despite the risk of claims of negligent enforcement of weapons
prohibitions or violations of OSHA guidelines, business owners
increasingly prohibit employees and non-employees from carrying
concealed weapons on business premises as a means of reducing the risk
of liability. 63
Unlike business owners in -other states, however,
56. Kohler, 615A.2dat3l.
57. But see D'Gata Nat'l Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 479 A.2d 98, 100
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984). An employee who provoked a robber by attempting to grab his
gun was still covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act because no pre-existing
animosity existed between the robber and the employee. Id. In D'Gata, however, the
employer had the burden of demonstrating the "personal reasons" exception because it
sought to deny the employee worker's compensation benefits. Id.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2002).
59. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 291.
60. See Mack, supra note 34, at 308-11.
61. See Dahl, supra note 11.
62. Id
63. A year after Texas passed concealed weapons legislation, each of the state's
twenty largest businesses had developed weapons prohibitions or were in the process of
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Pennsylvania business owners seeking to prohibit weapons from the
business premises have no legislative guidance and no legal recourse
against those who violate weapons prohibitions.
Statewide legislation allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons
with a valid permit began in Florida in 1987 and rapidly spread
throughout the United States. 64 Currently, all but seven states and the
District of Columbia permit citizens to carry concealed weapons.6 5
Concealed weapons legislation continues to provoke debate
between citizens seeking to exercise their right to bear arms and gun
control advocates seeking to preserve the public safety.66 Proponents of
concealed weapons legislation argue that citizens are entitled to exercise
their constitutional right to bear arms, that weapons are essential for selfdefense, and that permitting individuals to carry concealed weapons

actually reduces crime.67 Opponents argue that permitting concealed
weapons leads to a "Wild West" mentality that increases the number of
violent crimes committed using weapons.68
doing so. Id.
64. See id; see also Sam Verhovek, Concealed-Weapon Backers Packing Wallop,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at I 1B.

65. See infra note 73. Vermont is the only state that does not require citizens to
obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (2002).
66. See Mack, supra note 34, at 285. Concealed weapons legislation also figures
prominently in election debates. See James Dao, In Hunter's Havens, Gun Control Is
Riskfor Gore, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2000, at 1A; Thomas Fitzgerald, FisherTakes Aim at
Rendell's Stand on Guns, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 9, 2002; Jim Yardley, Bush Stand Is
Used To Turn Election Into a Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at 16A. The debate
also resurfaced in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Applications for
concealed weapons permits increased exponentially after September 11, 2001. See Jim
Sloan & Patty Ryan, 100 Days, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 20, 2001, at Spec. 1. Firearms sales
increased from 9 to 22 percent during September, October, and November of 2001. Al
Baker, A Nation Challenged. Steep Rise in Gun Sales Reflects Post-Attack Fears,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at IA. Gun manufacturers also began marketing a Homeland
Security Model firearm for "our current time of national need." Id. Proposed safety

precautions that would allow airline pilots to carry weapons also sparked debate. House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Subcommittee on Aviation Meets To
Mark up Legislation on Arming Pilots: Hearingon H.R. 4635, 107th Cong. (2002).
67. NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, RIGHT TO CARRY 2003 FACT SHEET (Jan. 10,
2003), availableat
http://www.nraila.org/FactSheets.asp?FornMode=Detail&lD=1 8& 1=View; see JOHN R.
LOTr, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998). Concealed weapons advocates also point to
low crime statistics of permit holders to support their claim that concealed weapons
carriers do not commit more crime. See Dan Harrie, Crimes Trigger Revocation of 584
Concealed-Weapon Permits, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 25, 2002, at AI (reporting that 1.3
percent of concealed weapons permit carriers in Utah commit serious crime while 4.1
percent of the general population nationally commit serious crime).
68. See Mack, supra note 34, at 286. "The citizens of this state do not want to return
to the Tombstone era when everyone is allowed to carry a gun and disputes are settled
by... whoever is the quickest draw." Mark Katches, Concealed Weapons Bill Killed,
Senate Panel Defeats Measure that Would Ease Permit Criteria, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July
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Pennsylvania Concealed Weapons Legislation

As a "shall issue" state, 69 Pennsylvania issues concealed weapons
permits to applicants without granting local officials discretion to deny a

permit if an applicant fails to demonstrate a need for a concealed
weapon.70
"Shall issue" states employ the most "liberal" policy
concerning the issuance of permits to carry concealed weapons.7' Unlike
72
states that allow local discretion in issuing concealed weapons permits

or jurisdictions that prohibit concealed weapons, 7 3 "shall issue" states
issue concealed weapons permits to qualified applicants without
requiring an applicant to demonstrate a need to carry a concealed
weapon.74
In Pennsylvania, the sheriff of each county "shall issue" a permit to
3, 1996, at N4. Gun control advocates argue that statistics showing decreases in crime
rates after states institute concealed weapons legislation are merely a result of the
national decrease in crime. See Baker, supra note 66.
69. "A license to carry a firearm... shall be issued if, after an investigation not to
exceed 45 days, it appears that the applicant is an individual whom no good cause exists
to deny the license." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6109(e) (2002). A firearm is "[a]ny pistol or
revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, any shotgun with a barrel length less
than 18 inches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 inches, or any pistol, revolver,
rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26 inches. The barrel length of a
firearm shall be determined by measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the face of the
closed action, bolt or cylinder, whichever is applicable." Id. § 6102.
70. See Mack, supra note 34, at 291.
71. See id. The following states have also enacted "shall issue" legislation: ALA.
CODE § 13A-1 1-75 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 (Michie 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3112 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT.
§ 790.06 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie
1996); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-27-2-3 (Michie 2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110
(Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2003 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28-422 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101
(1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.6 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 62.1-04-03 (1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.12 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291
(1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-171351 (1989); TEx. GOV'T CODE §411.177 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (2000);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070 (1995); W. VA.
CODE § 61-7-4 (1989); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (Michie 1982).
72. Mack, supra note 34, at 292 n.32. States that permit discretion by requiring an
applicant to "show cause" are the following: CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 1996);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-105.1 (1996); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1441 (1995);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (1993); IOWA CODE § 724.11 (1996); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 4-101 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:58-4 (West
1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11 (1994).
73. Mack, supra note 34, at 292 n.35. Jurisdictions prohibiting concealed weapons
are D.C. CODE § 22-4504 (2001); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1 (West 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4201 (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 281202(1) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2 (Michie 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.12 (Anderson 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (West 1996).
74. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106 (2002); supranote 71.
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carry a concealed weapon to any citizen who is at least twenty-one years
of age and is not explicitly prohibited from obtaining a permit. 75 After
conducting a background check,76 the sheriff issues a permit valid for
but no record
five years.7 7 The permit may be revoked for good cause,78 79
public.
made
be
may
revocation
or
application
citizen's
a
of
B

Legislative Protectionsfor Business Owners in Other "Shall Issue"

States as a Model for PennsylvaniaLegislation
Although Pennsylvania employs a "liberal" permitting policy, the
Commonwealth differs from other "shall issue" states because it does not

provide legislative guidance for business owners who want to prohibit
the carrying of concealed weapons by employees or others entering the
business premises. Other "shall issue" states grant express authority to
business owners to prohibit weapons, 80 provide criminal sanctions for
violators of weapons prohibitions, 8 1 and allow employers access to

records granting and revoking permits.82
1.

Express Legislative Authority To Prohibit Weapons

Prior to the enactment of concealed weapons legislation, business

owners could prohibit both employees and non-employees from carrying
weapons on the business premises as a reasonable safety measure.83

75. 18 PA. CONS. STAT § 6109 (2002). Explicit prohibitions include persons
convicted of certain crimes, illegal aliens, habitual drunkards, persons dishonorably
discharged from the armed forces, and a person whose character and reputation indicate
that the individual would act in a manner dangerous to the public safety. See id.
76. Id. § 6109(d).
77. Id. § 6109(f)(1).
78. Id. § 6109(i).
79. Id. § 6111 (i).
80. "Shall issue" states that expressly grant business owners authority to prohibit
weapons are the following: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(B)(1) (Michie 1995); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 237.110(14) (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(o) (1996);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-31-215(R) (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996);
W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (1989). In Texas, only employers are legislatively authorized to
prohibit concealed weapons. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 411.203 (1996); Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. JC-0325 (2001).
81. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996);
W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (1989). But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(14) (Michie
1996) (stating that violation of a weapons prohibition "shall not be a criminal act but may
subject the person to denial from the premises or removal from the premises, and, if an
employee of an employer, disciplinary measures by the employer").
82. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(A)(2)(a) (1996); TEX. GOV'T CODE
§ 411.192 (1996). But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.13 (2002) (stating that a list of
concealed weapons permit holders may be accessed by law enforcement personnel for
law enforcement purposes only).
83. See Dahl, supra note 11.
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While business owners in some "shall issue" states were guided by
legislation expressly granting them the right to prohibit weapons, 4
business owners in other "shall issue" states were left to question if they
could prohibit weapons without express legislative authority to do so.85
In states with legislation authorizing private property owners to
prohibit concealed weapons, private property owners are required to post
notices of the weapons prohibition. 86 In order to protect private property
owners from claims that weapons prohibition notices were inadequately
posted, the legislation often requires a specific size or wording of
notices.87
Business owners in Pennsylvania and other states that do not
authorize private property owners to prohibit weapons, however, need

84. See supra note 80.
85. See Dahl, supra note 11. In addition to Pennsylvania, the following "shall issue"
states do not expressly grant business owners the authority to prohibit weapons:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming.
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(B)(1) (Michie 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 237.110(14) (Michie 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 411.203 (1996).
87. Arkansas business owners must post a notice that is "clearly readable" at a
distance of ten feet that reads, "[C]arrying of a handgun is prohibited." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-73-306(B)(1) (Michie 1995). Mississippi business owners must post a notice that is
"clearly readable" at a distance of ten feet that reads, "[C]arrying of a pistol or revolver is
prohibited." MIss. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (1997). Tennessee business owners must
comply with the following for a weapons prohibition to be enforceable:
Posted notices shall be displayed in prominent locations, including all entrances
primarily used by persons entering the building .... If the possession of
weapons is also prohibited on the premises of any such property ...the notice
shall be posted at all entrances to the premises that are primarily used by
persons entering the property. The notice shall be in English but a notice may
also be posted in any language used by patrons .... In addition to the sign,
notice may also include the international circle and slash symbolizing the
prohibition of the item within the circle. The sign shall be of the size that is
plainly visible to the average person entering the building... and shall contain
language similar to the following: "Pursuant to § 39-17-1359, the owner,
operator of this property has banned weapons on this property, or within the
building or this portion of this building. Failure to comply with this prohibition
is punishable as a criminal act under state law and may subject the violator to a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500)."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996); Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 00-161 (2000). Texas
business owners may either provide notice by "a card or other document on which is
written language identical to the following: 'Pursuant to Section 30.06 Penal Code
(trespass by holder of license to carry a concealed handgun), a person licensed under
Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (concealed handgun law), may not enter
this property with a concealed handgun"' or by a sign posted on the property that
includes the above quoted language in both English and Spanish and "appears in
contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height ... and is displayed in a
conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public." TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996).
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legislative guidance on how to prohibit weapons.
Although no
Pennsylvania court has addressed the issue, legal scholars analyzing
similar legislation in other states unanimously conclude that private
property owners may prohibit weapons without express legislative
authority. 88
Pennsylvania business owners prohibiting weapons,
however, lack uniform guidance on how to post weapons prohibitions.
Without a statute specifying the legally sufficient method of posting,
business owners could lose the protection from liability afforded by a
weapons prohibition; injured parties could claim that an inconspicuous
notice" amounts to a lack of a prohibition because concealed weapons
carriers may not realize that they are prohibited from the premises. 90
However, legislation authorizing business owners to prohibit
weapons and providing methods of notice posting could violate a
citizen's right to bear arms under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Unlike
the United States Constitution, 9 1Pennsylvania and forty-one other states'

88. See Mack, supra note 34, at 293-297; Dahl, supra note 11; Sylvia Moreno, Bush
Says Agencies Overreactingto Gun Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 1, 1995, at 1; Ed
Vogel, New Gun Law Now in Effect, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 1, 1995, at B.
89. Business owners may post inconspicuous notices out of a fear that customers
will think that the business premises is unsafe.
See Matthew Dolan, Panel Oks
Concealed Weapons in Bars, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al.
90. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 299-300. This claim would most likely not
apply to employees who carried a concealed weapon because published workplace safety
policies would provide adequate notice. Policies should be "broad in focus incorporating
all employment structures including those of subsidiaries and affiliates and also parking
lots and employee vehicles in those lots. For purposes of clarity, the policy should
contain a definition section defining such terms as 'employees,' 'weapons,' 'carrying,'
and 'possessing' ....
An employer who enacts a no-weapons policy and then fails to
enforce and implement it properly may indeed aid a victim in proving that the employer's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury." Id. But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 237.110(14) (Michie 1996) (prohibiting private employers from banning employees
from carrying concealed weapons in employee-owned vehicles even if the vehicles are
parked in the employer's parking lot).
91. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has traditionally been
read to ensure only a collective right of the government to form a militia. U.S. v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174 (1939):
The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power--"To
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." With obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.
Id. at 178. For debate over whether the Second Amendment should be read to provide an
individual right, see Symposium, Is the Right To Bear Arms Individual, Collective,
Insurrectionist,or Both?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 797 (2000).
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constitutions either explicitly grant or are consistently interpreted to
grant a fundamental, individual right to bear arms.92 The Pennsylvania
Constitution provides: "The rights of the citizens to 93
bear arms in defense
of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.,
Unlike other states specifically authorizing private property owners
to prohibit concealed weapons, Pennsylvania does not authorize the
legislature to regulate the carrying of weapons in its "right to bear arms"
constitutional provision.94 In Nevada, a state whose constitution does not
authorize the legislature to regulate the carrying of weapons, 95 legislators
rejected a provision of the concealed weapons legislation authorizing
private property owners to prohibit weapons.96 The Nevada Senate
Judiciary Committee feared that the provision would subject legislators
to lawsuits
accusing them of infringing upon citizens' right to bear
97
arms.

However, Pennsylvania courts, unlike those in Nevada, recognize

92. David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment,
29 N. KY. L. REV. 823, 846 (2002). The Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution is not applicable to the states. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
"The Second Amendment declares that [the right to bear arms] shall not be infringed; but
this.., means no more than it shall not be infringed by Congress." Id.
93. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21. "The ownership of firearms is constitutionally protected
[and therefore] its regulation is a matter of statewide concern." Ortiz v. Commonwealth,
681 A.2d 152 (Pa. 1996) (invalidating a ban on assault weapons enacted by
municipalities).
94. See Kopel, supra note 92, at 824-44. "All men are, by nature, free and equal,
and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: First:
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties ....Seventh: The right to
bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General
Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons." KY.
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1. "The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying
of weapons concealed on the person." LA. CONST. art. I, § 11. "The right of every citizen
to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called into question, but the
legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons." MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 12. "The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or
property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be
prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the
carrying of weapons." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26. "That the citizens of this State have a
right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime." TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 26. "Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the
lawful defense of himself and the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to
regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime." TEX. CONST.art I, § 23.
95. "Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for
lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes." NEV. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1 (1).
96. Vogel, supra note 88.
97. Id.
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that the individual right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation
in order to preserve public safety.9 8 Legislation granting business owners
the discretion to prohibit concealed weapons and giving guidance to
those who choose to do so could be regarded as a reasonable regulation
promulgated to preserve public safety.
Like Pennsylvania, West Virginia recognizes that the right to bear
arms may be limited by reasonable regulations so long as those
regulations are not overly broad. 99 Although West Virginia's
constitution, like Pennsylvania's, does not grant the legislature power to
regulate the carrying of weapons, l00 West Virginia's concealed weapons
legislation authorizes private property owners to prohibit weapons. 01
West Virginia's legislation permitting private property owners to prohibit
has yet to be challenged under the
concealed weapons, passed in 1989,
10 2
state's right to bear arms provision.
2.
Criminal Sanctions for Violators of Weapons Prohibitions
Pennsylvania business owners also need legislation subjecting
violators of concealed weapons prohibitions to criminal sanctions. Other
"shall issue" states recognize that criminal sanctions are necessary to
ensure that business owners can adequately enforce weapons
prohibitions. 0 3 Without criminal sanctions, a business owner would
have to enforce the prohibition by herself and could face liability for
98. "That the right to bear arms, guaranteed by the [Pennsylvania] Constitution is
not an unlimited right is almost universally accepted. A reasonable regulation in a gun
control law is a valid exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth prescribing for
the good order and protection of its citizens." Commonwealth v. Ray, 272 A.2d 275, 279
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1970), vacatedon proceduralgrounds, 292 A.2d 410 (Pa. 1972); see, e.g.,
Gardner v. Jenkins, 541 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). The majority of other
states interpreting similar constitutional provisions agree that legislation regulating the
right to bear arms must be reasonable to be a valid exercise of police power. Arnold v.
Cleveland, 616 N.E. 2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993); see also Jones v. Arkansas, 862 S.W.2d
273, 275 (Ark. 1993); Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 329 (Colo.
1994) (citations omitted); Masters v. Texas, 653 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983);
City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 143 (W. Va. 1988).
99. See City of Princeton, 377 S.E.2d at 142. The West Virginia Supreme Court
held unconstitutional legislation that both prohibited carrying a concealed weapon and
failed to provide citizens with a means to obtain a permit. Id. at 149.
100. "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use." W. VA. CONST. art. Ill,
§22.
101.
"[A]ny owner, lessee, or any other person charged with care, custody and control
of real property may prohibit the carrying openly or concealing of any firearm or deadly
weapon on property under his or her domain." W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (2002).
102. See id.
103. This recognition is evidenced by the fact that states providing criminal sanctions
require that those criminal sanctions be included in the weapons prohibition notice. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-7-14 (1989).
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false imprisonment or assault. 10 4 A business owner could be liable for
false imprisonment if she seizes a concealed weapon or otherwise detains
the prohibition violator. 10 5 If the business owner attempts to forcibly
be liable for civil assault or perhaps face
remove the violator, she 0could
6
charges.1
assault
criminal
In Texas, violators of weapons prohibitions commit criminal
trespass. 0 7 Although Texas only explicitly authorizes employers and not
all private property owners to prohibi-t weapons, 10 8 a criminal statute
authorizes all property owners to bring a criminal trespass action against
violators of weapons prohibitions. 10 9 The property owner or her
authorized representative must have posted statutorily adequate notice in
order for the violator to be convicted of criminal trespass." 0
In Tennessee and West Virginia, violators of concealed weapons
prohibitions can be charged with a misdemeanor."' Tennessee imposes
a five hundred dollar fine, 1 2 and West Virginia imposes up to a one
thousand dollar fine or six months in the county jail. 1 3 In West Virginia,
business owners must first ask the concealed weapons carrier to
14
relinquish the weapon or to exit the business premises.'
Pennsylvania business owners need criminal sanctions against
violators of weapons prohibitions. Under the current criminal statutes, a
concealed weapons carrier must intend to use the weapon in a criminal
act before the carrier commits a crime. 1 5 Not all violators of weapons
prohibitions will have a criminal intent.
Pennsylvania business owners could not post notices that
prohibition violators commit criminal trespass because it remains unclear
whether a violator of a weapons prohibition could be charged with
criminal trespass under current Pennsylvania law. Although violators
enter the premises despite the business owner's communication that
concealed weapons are prohibited, 1 6 it is a defense to criminal trespass if
104. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. DM-363 (1995).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See TEX.PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996).
108. See TEX. Gov'T CODE § 411.203 (1996).
109. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-0325 (2001).
110. TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.06 (1996).
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (1989).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359 (1996).
113. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (1989).
114. Id.
115. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 907 (2002). An individual carrying a concealed
weapon with the intent to use it criminally commits a misdemeanor. Id.
116. "A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to
do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice to trespass is given by...
actual communication to the actor. .. [or] posting in a manner prescribed by law or
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the premises are open to the public and the individual complies with all
lawful conditions imposed on access to the premises. 1 7 Because private
property owners in Pennsylvania are not explicitly authorized by law to
prohibit weapons, a violator could argue that she complied with all
conditions imposed by law and only violated a condition imposed by an
individual."18
3. Access to Records Granting and Revoking Permits
Business owners who prohibit employees from carrying concealed
weapons should enforce that prohibition by requiring prospective and
current employees to disclose if they possess a concealed weapons
permit or have had a permit revoked.11 9 In Pennsylvania, however,
employers cannot access permit information
and therefore cannot verify
20
information provided by employees. 1
Texas employers can verify concealed weapons permit information
provided by employees through the Texas Department of Public
Safety. 121 Upon a written request and the payment of a reasonable fee,
any individual can verify whether any other individual possesses a
concealed weapons permit.1 22 Under the Texas Open Records Act,
employers can also obtain the identities
of individuals who have had a
123
revoked.
or
denied,
suspended,
permit
Pennsylvania employers need legislation similar to that in Texas.
Without legislation granting access to permit information, employers
cannot adequately enforce a weapons prohibition because they are unable
to verify permit information provided by employees. The current
confidentiality legislation in Pennsylvania prevents employers from
conducting adequate background checks; as a result, employers are
left
24
vulnerable to a claim of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.'

reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders." Id § 3503(b).
117. Id.§ 3503(c)(2).
118. In Kentucky, prohibition violators cannot be charged with any crime. KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 237.110(14) (Michie 1996).
119.

See Dahl, supra note 11.

120. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111 (i) (2002). "All information provided by... any
applicant for a license to carry a firearm under section 6109 shall be confidential and not
subject to public disclosure. In addition to any other sanction or penalty imposed by this
chapter, any person, licensed dealer, state or local government agency or department that
violates this subsection shall be liable in civil damages in the amount of $1,000 per
occurrence or three times the actual damages incurred as a result of the violation,
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees." Id.
121. TEX. Gov'TCODE § 411.192 (1996).
122. id.The Department of Public Safety must also notify any permit holder of the
identity of the person or agency requesting the permit information. Id.
123. See Dahl, supra note 11.
124. See supra Part II.A.2. and accompanying notes.
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IV. Conclusion
As incidents of workplace violence gain greater media attention,
business owners seek to prevent violence by prohibiting weapons on the
business premises. By prohibiting weapons, business owners may also
Although business owners who
decrease their risk of liability.
inadequately enforce a weapons prohibition could be held liable,
prohibiting weapons decreases the chance that a weapons-related injury
will occur and demonstrates a reasonable attempt to protect customers
and employees.
Pennsylvania business owners who prohibit weapons need
legislative guidance. In order to adequately implement and enforce a
weapons prohibition, business owners need explicit authority to prohibit
weapons, guidelines for notice posting, criminal sanctions against
violators of prohibitions, and access to permitting information.
However, even with legislative guidance business owners must still
seek practical methods of carrying out a weapons prohibition. Will
concealed weapons carriers be permitted to "check" their weapons at the
door? 125 Should employers provide employees with lockers to store their
weapons? Will business owners be forced to hire full-time security
personnel to detect prohibition violators?
Ultimately, business owners face legal uncertainty in the wake of
concealed weapons legislation. Legislative guidance will be the first but
perhaps the most important step in protecting Pennsylvania business
owners. With legislation as proposed in this Comment, Pennsylvania
business owners will finally have the same protection as business owners
in other "shall issue" states.

125.

See Dahl, supra note 11.

